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Davis v. United States:
"Maybe I Should Talk to a Lawyer"
Means Maybe Miranda is Unraveling
I. INTRODUCTION
Extensive exposure of police stories in the media has familiarized
almost everyone with the phrase: "You have the right to remain silent.
Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.
You have the right to have an attorney present before and during any
questioning. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for
you free of charge."' In 1966, Miranda v. Arizona set forth these
rights, now commonly known as the Miranda rights.3 While most peo-
ple know they can waive these rights, not many people are aware they
can re-initiate them at any time during an interrogation.4 If a suspect
1. Detective Stewart McCarroll of the Brea Police Department gave this version of
the Miranda rights. Police and other law enforcement personnel give different varia-
tions of these rights. See, e.g., JOHN C. KLOTrER & JACQUEuNE P. KANOVITZ, CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW FOR POLICE § 6.4 (3d ed. 1977). However, all forms are substantially the
same. Constitutional Law For Police states the Miranda rights as:
(1) "You have the right to remain silent and say nothing."
(2) "If you do make a statement, anything you say can and will be used
against you in court."
(3) "You have the right to have an attorney present or to consult with an
attorney."
(4) "If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you prior to
any questioning if you so desire."
Id.
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. Id. Miranda involved four different cases of confessions, garnered during cus-
todial interrogations, which led to conviction at the respective trial courts. Id. Three
of those convictions were affirmed on appeal, and the Supreme Court granted the
defendants' petition for certiorari. Id. In the fourth case, the State of California chal-
lenged the California Supreme Court's reversal of the conviction below. Id. For facts
of the four cases, see State v. Miranda, 401 P.2d 721 (Ariz. 1965) (en banc), rev'd,
384 U.S. 436 (1966); People v. Vignera, 207 N.E.2d 527 (N.Y. 1965), rev'd sub nom.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Westover v. United States, 342 F.2d 684 (9th
Cir. 1965), rev'd sub nom. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); People v. Stewart,
400 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1965), affd sub nom. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
4. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
invokes his right to counsel at any time during the interrogation, the
police must stop all questioning until an attorney is present.' But, what
statements invoke this right?6 The Supreme Court appeared to answer
this question in 1981, with its decision in Edwards v. Arizona,' by
holding that a suspect must "clearly assert" his right to have counsel
present.8 However, Edwards did not address what the police should do
when encountering a suspect who makes an ambiguous request for
counsel.' The Court has not yet decided this issue, even though the
lower courts have all adopted one of three varying approaches."0
The need to finally resolve this issue appears obvious. Depending on
which jurisdiction or state the police question a suspect in, the result of
that suspect's ambiguous request for counsel could yield drastically
different results. If police ignore a suspect's ambiguous request, one
jurisdiction would suppress any subsequent statements, another would
admit the statements only if the police determine, through clarifying
questions, that the suspect intended to waive his rights, while a third
would admit any later statements." Therefore, when Davis, a murder
suspect, said, "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer," the Court finally ac-
cepted the opportunity to decide the issue of ambiguous requests for
counsel. 2
This Casenote will analyze the Court's landmark decision in Davis v.
United States" and discuss its possible effect on the Miranda rights.
Part II reviews the evolution of law protecting a custodial suspect
against self-incrimination and the right to have counsel present during
5. Id. If the suspect requests counsel, "the interrogation must cease until an attor-
nef is present." Id.
6. Courts at various levels have come up with different requirements. Compare
infra notes 85-100 and accompanying text with notes 101-22 and accompanying text
and with notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
7. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
8. Id. at 485.
9. See infra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 82-134. The first approach requires the po-
lice to stop all questioning when a suspect makes an ambiguous request for counsel.
See infra text accompanying notes 85-100. The second approach limits police ques-
tioning to clarifying an ambiguous request. See infra text accompanying notes 101-22.
The third approach allows the police to ignore ambiguous requests for counsel and
continue the interrogation. See infra text accompanying notes 124-34.
11. See infra notes 82-134 and accompanying text. Therefore, depending on the
suspect's jurisdiction, he may be acquitted or convicted, which are extreme results.
12. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994). The Court has had numerous
opportunities to decide this issue, as evidenced by the numerous state and federal
cases involving ambiguous requests for counsel. See infra notes 82-134 and accompa-
nying text.
13. 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
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custodial interrogations 4 and discusses the Court's future direction in
terms of protecting this right. Part III summarizes the facts of the
case, 5 leading into part IV, which analyzes and critiques the opinions
of the Justices. 6 The consequences of the Court's decision, from pro-
moting police efficiency to possibly signaling an end to Miranda; are
discussed in part V.' Part V then continues with a discussion of the
possibility and the merits of a reversal of Davis, as well as a recom-
mended approach for dealing with ambiguous requests for counsel.
Finally, part VI concludes the casenote with some thoughts on the
Court's handling of this case. 9
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Supreme Court Decisions
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees a criminal sus-
pect the right against self-incrimination. ° In order to protect this right,
the Court stated in Miranda v. Arizona that "the prosecution may not
use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from
custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use
of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination."' These safeguards have become known as the Miranda
rights, which basically require police to advise a suspect that he has the
right to remain silent and to have an attorney present during
interrogation." The right to have an attorney present prevents the po-
lice from eliciting incriminating statements through coercion or psycho-
logical pressure.23 Since the Court found that custodial interrogations
14. See infra notes 20-135 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 136-52 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 153-257 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 258-93 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 294-337 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 33841 and accompanying text.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides that no person "shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id.
21. 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). The Court defined custodial interrogation as
.questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into
custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Id.
22. Id. The Court required that "[plrior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may
be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attor-
ney, either retained or appointed." Id.
23. See id. at 466. The Court stated that the essence of interrogations is "[t]o be
involved such a substantial risk of coercion, it declared that "the right
to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the
protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege."24 In recognizing the im-
portance of having counsel present during interrogations, the Court
seemed to make it easy for the suspect to invoke this right." A suspect
is only required to indicate "in any manner and at any stage" that he
wants an attorney present. 6 Even though the plain meaning of the
words "in any manner" connotes a loose standard for invoking the right,
the Court implied a need for a more rigid standard.27 To be effective,
waiver must be made "voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, "' which
suggests some level of certainty. However, the Court did not explicitly
advocate a requisite level of clarity to invoke the right to counsel.
In 1975, the Court appeared to take a more limited reading of
Miranda rights in Michigan v. Mosely.' Rejecting a strict application
of Miranda to bar all new interrogations, the Court instead looked to
"[a] review of the circumstances leading to [the] confession" to deter-
mine when a suspect waives his rights."° Disregarding surrounding cir-
cumstances would both deter legitimate police investigation and deprive
suspects of their right to choose their course of action." Thus, the
alone with the suspect . . . to prevent distraction and to deprive him of any outside
support." Id. at 455. Requiring a criminal suspect to have an attorney present would
alleviate this problem. See id.
24. Id. at 469.
25. See id. at 472. Later cases show that this was not exactly the case, as confu-
sion arose as to how a suspect could invoke the right to have an attorney present.
See i fra notes 82-134.
26. Miranda, 389 U.S. at 44445 (emphasis added).
27. See id. at 473-74.
28. Id. at 444.
29. 423 U.S. 96 (1975). Mosely invoked his right to remain silent after police read
him his Miranda rights. Id. at 97. The officers stopped their interrogation, but later, a
different officer at a different location asked Mosely about an unrelated crime. Id. at
97-98. This new officer then read Mosely his rights again, but this time Mosely did
not invoke his right to remain silent and proceeded to talk to the officer voluntarily.
Id. at 98. Mosely claimed that the Court should suppress these statements. Id. at 98-
99.
30. Id. at 104. Using the totality of circumstances standard, the Court found that
Mosely's "'right to cut off questioning' was fully respected." Id. The Court found no
Miranda violation because the first set of officers fully honored Mosely's request to
cease questioning and the second interrogation entailed a completely new situation
with a new officer, new location, and new interrogation about a different crime. Id.
With this new situation, Mosely voluntarily waived his rights; thus, there was no
Miranda violation. Id. at 105-07.
31. Id. at 102. The Court stated that "a blanket prohibition against the taking of
voluntary statements or a permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless
of the circumstances, would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational
obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity, and deprive suspects of an oppor-
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Court moved towards a more flexible approach permitting limited re-
newed interrogations, rather than an all-encompassing Miranda blan-
ket.
However, two years later, the Court seemed to expand Miranda
rights in Brewer v. Williams.' In holding that the police violated a
suspect's Miranda right to counsel, the Court required that "courts
indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver. "' The State
has the burden of proving that a suspect actually gave up his rights, not
just that he understood them.' Thus, the Court seemed to be giving
broader Miranda protection by making waiver of the rights more diffi-
cult.
The Court appeared to change its position again two years later, in
North Carolina v. Butler." Instead of making waiver more difficult,
the Court made it easier by allowing implicit waivers." In striking
tunity to make informed and intelligent assessments of their interests." Id. •
32. 430 U.S. 387 (1977). After the police arrested Williams for abducting a 10-year
old girl, they advised him of his Miranda rights. Id. at 390. The police agreed not to
interrogate Williams while transporting him. Id. at 391-92. During the trip, Williams
never expressed a willingness to talk to the police; in fact, he said several times that
"[wihen I get to Des Moines and see [my lawyer], I am going to tell you the whole
story." Id. at 392. The detective then engaged Williams in conversation and made him
feel guilty based on his religious beliefs. Id. at 392-93. Because of this, Williams con-
fessed, and his lawyer sought to exclude these statements and evidence resulting
from them. Id. at 393.
33. Id. at 404 (citing Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4 (1966); Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942)) (emphasis added). This statement implies that equivo-
cal or ambiguous waivers are not effective to waive a suspect's Miranda rights. See
id.
34. Id. at 404. The Court reiterated that "it was incumbent upon the State to
prove 'an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.'"
Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
35. 441 U.S. 369 (1979). After the FBI agents arrested the defendant and read him
his Miranda rights, they asked him if he understood these rights. Id. at 370-71. After
the defendant replied that he understood these rights, the agents asked him to sign a
form to waive the rights. Id. at 371. He refused to sign the waiver, but did say, "I
will talk to you but I am not signing any form." Id. The suspect then made incrimi-
nating statements, which he claimed the Court should suppress because he had not
waived his right to counsel. Id. The trial court found that Butler waived his Miranda
rights, even though he did not sign an express waiver. Id. at 371-72.
36. See id. at 373. In reversing the trial court, the North Carolina Supreme Court
relied on its rule that implicit waivers are not adequate to waive a suspect's Miranda
rights. See id. at 372. The Court reversed, stating that "in at least some cases waiver
can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated." Id. at
373.
down the rule that only explicit waivers, either written or oral, are
effective, the Court focused on whether the suspect waived his rights
"knowingly and voluntarily" rather than the form of the suspect's
waiver.37 Thus, words and actions can be sufficient to waive a
suspect's rights, but the presumption is still against waiver.' The Court
consequently returned to looking at the circumstances in determining if
a waiver was voluntary.39
In Edwards v. Arizona," the Court again redefined the requirements
for an effective waiver. The Arizona Supreme Court applied the totality
of the circumstances test in finding that Edwards waived his rights
when he voluntarily spoke with police after he had invoked his right to
counsel during an interrogation the day before.4' The Court reversed,
holding that police cannot "re-interrogate an accused in custody if he
has clearly asserted his right to counsel."42 The "clearly asserted" lan-
guage appears to require a precise statement to invoke the right to
counsel, which seems to overrule the "in any manner" language of
Miranda. The Court, however, did not define the level required to satis-
fy a "clearly asserted" invocation. The holding in Edwards also shows
the importance the Court attaches to protecting the right to counsel by
requiring more than a passive waiver of that right; the suspect must
"himself initiate[] further communication."43 In rejecting the broader
totality of circumstances test for the stricter knowing and intelligent
37. Id. "The question is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact
knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case." Id.
38. See id. The Court went on to say that "courts must presume that a defendant
did not waive his rights; the prosecution's burden is great." Id.
39. Id. From the Court's holding, one might argue that reinitiating the right to
counsel should be given the same latitude, as it would hardly seem fair to allow a
suspect to easily waive his Miranda rights, but make it difficult to reinitiate them.
40. 451 U.S. 477 (1981). Police interrogated Edwards after giving him his Miranda
rights. Id. at 478-79. After Edwards said he wanted an attorney, the police stopped
all questioning. Id. at 479. But the next day, the police asked him more questions. Id.
After the police gave Edwards his Miranda rights again, Edwards said he wanted to
talk. Id. Edwards confessed, but then sought to suppress his confession on the
grounds that it violated his Miranda right to counsel. Id. at 479-80.
41. See id. at 480.
42. Id. at 485 (emphasis added). The Court stated that "the Arizona Supreme Court
applied an erroneous standard for determining waiver where the accused has specifi-
cally invoked his right to counsel." Id. at 482. The standard must be a knowing and
intelligent waiver. Id.
43. Id. at 484-85. In its holding, the Court has "strongly indicated that additional
safeguards are necessary when the accused asks for counsel; and ... a valid waiver
of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further po-
lice-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights." Id. at
484.
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waiver, the Court sought to affirmatively protect a suspect's right to
have counsel during interrogation.'
Two years later, the Court addressed the Edwards test in Oregon v.
Bradshaw.5 After the Oregon Court of Appeals held that Bradshaw
had not "initiated" further conversation under Edwards, the Court re-
versed and in the process delineated the Edwards test." The Court set
out a two-part test for determining whether a suspect effectively waived
his right to counsel after he had initially invoked that right.47 First, a
court must determine if a suspect "initiated" further conversation as
required by Edwards.4' The Court enunciated a low standard for initi-
ating further conversation by requiring only that the statement "repre-
sent a desire on the part of an accused to open up a more generalized
discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation."41 If the
court finds initiation, it must then determine whether the suspect
knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel, based on a
"totality of circumstances. "' Because of the low threshold for initiating
44. See id. at 485. After Edwards, the Court made it more difficult to waive
Miranda rights, thus giving the custodial defendant greater protection against self-
incrimination.
45. 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). Police arrested Bradshaw and advised him of his
Miranda rights. Id. at 1041. After briefly talking with the officers, Bradshaw invoked
his right by saying, "I do want an attorney before it goes very much further." Id. at
1041-42. The officer immediately ended the questioning. Id. at 1042. Sometime later,
Bradshaw asked an officer, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?" Id. In re-
sponse, the officer replied that Bradshaw did not have to say anything since he had
already requested a lawyer. Id. After Bradshaw said he understood, the officer dis-
cussed Bradshaw's situation with him. Id. Subsequently, Bradshaw admitted his guilt.
Id.
46. Id. at 1044.
47. Id. at 1045-46.
48. Id. at 1044. The court of appeals ruled that Edwards only required an "initia-
tion" to satisfy the Edwards rule. See id. at 1045. The Court disagreed, stating that
this was only the first part of the Edwards test. Id. at 1045-46.
49. Id. at 1045. The Court also defined "initiated" as the "ordinary dictionary sense
of that word." Id. However, the Court stopped short of allowing all requests or
statements to be initiations. Id. "Bare inquir[ies]" do not qualify, such as asking for
water or the telephone, because these are necessary and routine inquiries arising out
of the "custodial relationship" and are not indicative of a desire to discuss the inves-
tigation. Id. With these minimal thresholds, the Court found that Bradshaw had clear-
ly "'initiated further conversation.'" Id.
50. Id. at 1046. The Court readopted the totality of circumstances standard enunci-
ated in Butler, but only for the second prong of the Edwards test. Id. Because the
state court determined that Bradshaw understood his rights and was not subject to
coercion or improper police conduct, the Court agreed with the state court in finding
further conversation, fairness would seem to dictate a low threshold for
reinvoking that right. However, the Court again did not address the
issue of what is required to reinvoke the right to counsel.
In 1984, Smith v. Illinois" provided the Court its first opportunity
to address ambiguous requests for counsel. The Illinois Supreme Court
presented the Court with this issue when it held that Smith's statement
of "[u]h, yeah. I'd like to do that" was an ambiguous request for counsel
that did not invoke the right."
The Court reiterated its position that once a suspect has invoked his
right to counsel, police cannot further interrogate him unless "he validly
waives" this right.' Since the Court had settled the valid waiver issue,
it focused on the requirements to invoke the right to counsel.' Initially
the Court showed its reluctance to define the level of clarity required to
invoke the right, citing conflicting Supreme Court precedents." Howev-
er, the Court recognized that the question of an effective assertion is a
"threshold inquiry," which may involve ambiguous requests. 6 The
Court noted the three conflicting approaches to equivocal requests for
counsel adopted by various state and federal courts, but declined to
address the issue.
that Bradshaw's statement was voluntary and made after a knowing waiver. Id.
51. 469 U.S. 91 (1984) (per curiam). The police arrested Smith and detectives ad-
vised him of his Miranda rights. Id. at 92-93. After detectives advised him of his
right to counsel and asked him if he understood, Smith said, "Uh, yeah. I'd like to
do that." Id. at 93 (citing People v. Smith, 466 N.E.2d 236, 238 (In.), rev'd, 469 U.S.
91 (1984) (per curiam)). Instead of halting the interrogation, the detectives continued
asking more questions about the right to counsel. Id. Smith replied ambiguously until
he finally stated that he would talk to the detectives. Id. On further questioning,
Smith confessed and then invoked his right to counsel. Id. at 93-94. The detectives
stopped the interrogation immediately. Id. at 94. Smith sought to suppress the confes-
sion, but both the trial court and the Illinois Appellate Court denied the request,
finding that Smith never made an effective request for counsel. Id. The Illinois Su-
preme Court affirmed, holding that Smith's statements were ambiguous and not an
effective request for counsel. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 94-95 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981)).
54. Id. at 95-100. The Court repeated its holding in Edwards, which required fur-
ther initiation and a knowing and intelligent waiver. Id. at 95 (citing Edwards, 451
U.S. at 485-86, 486 n.9).
55. Id. The Court uses both the language of "clearly assert[ing]" the right in Ed-
wards, and conflicting language of "indicate[d] in any manner" in Miranda in discuss-
ing the issue of invoking the right to counsel. Id. (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-
85, and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966)).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 95-96, 96 n.3. The Court did not decide the issue of ambiguous requests
for counsel, because the request in Smith is not ambiguous. Id. at 96-97. Therefore,
the same result occurs regardless of which of the three approaches is used. Id. at
96. The Court could have chosen to address the issue in dicta, but it decided not to
[Vol. 23: 607, 1996] Davis v. United States
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Instead, the Court's analysis focused on the proper approach for
requests for counsel.' The Court held that once a suspect requests
counsel, all questioning must stop and further statements or responses
cannot be used to determine whether the suspect effectively requested
counsel.' The Court pointed out that subsequent statements are only
relevant in determining whether a suspect made an effective waiver.'
In stating that "[w]here nothing about the request for counsel or the cir-
cumstances leading up to the request would render it ambiguous, all
questioning must cease," the Court seemed to imply that only unambig-
uous requests invoke the right to counsel."' However, the Court left
that question unanswered.
In Michigan v. Jackson,' the Court appeared to lean toward a low
threshold for invoking the right to counsel.' The Court emphasized the
importance of protecting a suspect's rights, declaring that "we presume
that the defendant requests the lawyer's services at every critical stage
of the prosecution. " ' If this presumption exists, one could infer that
do so. See id.
58. Id. at 96-100.
59. Id. at 100. The Court emphasized that "[a] statement either is such an asser-
tion [of the right to counsel] or it is not." Id. at 97-98 (quoting People v. Smith, 466
N.E.2d 236, 241 (III.) (Simon, J., dissenting), rev'd, 469 U.S. 91 (1984)). The Court
also stated that "[u]sing an accused's subsequent responses to cast doubt on the
adequacy of the initial request itself is even more intolerable." Id. at 98-99.
60. Id. at 98. "[An accused's subsequent statements are relevant only to the ques-
tion of whether the accused waived the right he had invoked. Invocation and waiver
are entirely distinct inquiries, and the two must not be blurred by merging them
together." Id.
61. Id. Even though the Court's statement may have implied that only unambigu-
ous requests for counsel cut off questioning, it still left unanswered the question of
whether police can narrow ambiguous requests. Even in its conclusion, the Court
made clear that the "decision is a narrow one," which neither decided how to handle
circumstances proceeding an ambiguous request for counsel nor the consequences of
such a request. Id. at 99-100.
62. 475 U.S. 625 (1986). After suspects invoked their right to counsel at an arraign-
ment, police continued the interrogation and elicited confessions. Id. at 627-28. The
Court held that the right to counsel attaches during arraignment interrogations, and
as with any custodial interrogations, any waiver after an assertion of the right is
invalid. Id. at 636.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 633. Other statements also indicate a strong presumption for protecting a
suspect's right to counsel. Id. For "an alleged waiver of a . . . right to counsel, the
Court ... should 'indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamen-
tal constitutional rights.'" Id. (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938)).
"Doubts must be resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim." Id.
courts should presume that any request for counsel, no matter how
vague or ambiguous, is a valid request.' Therefore, the Court's state-
ment seemed to indicate a willingness to accept ambiguous requests to
invoke the right to counsel.' The Court's statement that "questions of
waiver require[] us to give a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation
to a defendant's request for counsel"67 further indicated the Court's
willingness to accept ambiguous requests.
The Court did not recognize the issue of ambiguous requests for
counsel until Connecticut v. Barrett," about two years after Smith.
The Court relegated its discussion of ambiguous requests to a footnote
and simply noted that the Court need not decide the issue unresolved
from Smith.' However, the Court did decide that Barrett's statement,
because he refused to provide a written statement but would talk with
the police, only invoked a limited right to counsel." Barrett simply in-
voked his right to have counsel present during a written statement, but
waived his right to an attorney while talking to the police.7' The Court
focused on the ordinary meaning of a suspect's statement.72
Even though the Court did not address ambiguous requests, its hold-
ing indicates the Court's heading. By construing some requests as in-
voking only limited rights to counsel, the Court may have required un-
ambiguous requests to invoke the right to counsel. 3 However, the
Court may have indicated that ambiguous requests may be valid when it
stated, "[T]o conclude that respondent invoked his right to counsel for




68. 479 U.S. 523 (1987). After the police gave Barrett his Miranda rights, Barrett
said he would talk to the police, but would not "make a written statement outside
the presence of counsel". Id. at 525. Thirty minutes later, police gave Barrett his
Miranda rights again, and again Barrett said he would talk, but not provide any
written statement. Id. He then confessed to the police. Id. When the police discov-
ered that they had failed to record the confession, they advised Barrett of his rights
a third time. Id. at 525-26. After Barrett reiterated his refusal to give any written
statement and his willingness to talk, he confessed again. Id. at 526. The trial court
rejected Barrett's claim to suppress the confession, but the Connecticut Supreme
Court reversed, holding that Barrett "had invoked his right to counsel." Id. at 526.
69. Id. at 529-30 n.3. The Court did not need to resolve the issue because "Barrett
made clear his intentions." Id. at 529.
70. Id. at 529-30.
71. Id. at 529.
72. Id.
73. Id. The Court stated that "[i]nterpretation is only required where the
defendant's words, understood as ordinary people would understand them, are ambig-
uous." Id. One can view the Court's holding as its unwillingness to expand a
suspect's right to counsel from what he specifically invoked.
[Vol. 23: 607, 1996] Davis v. United States
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ment, but a disregard of the ordinary meaning of respondent's state-
ment.""'
In Arizona v. Roberson,75 the Court provided a final indication of
how it might decide the issue of ambiguous requests for counsel."6 In
holding that once a suspect invokes the right to counsel, police cannot
initiate questioning, even if the officers were unaware of the earlier
invocation" or if the questioning concerned a different crime,'8 the
Court affirmatively attempted to protect a suspect's right to counsel.'
This broad protection of the right to counsel does not seem to exclude
ambiguous requests from effectively invoking that right.'
Therefore, even though the Court has not decided the issue of how to
handle ambiguous requests for counsel, it acknowledged the issue and
74. Id. at 529-30. The statement appears to suggest that if a statement does not
have an ordinary meaning, i.e., the statement is ambiguous, then the statement re-
quires a broad interpretation, which would favor accepting equivocal requests as ef-
fective assertions of the right to counsel.
75. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
76. After police arrested Roberson for burglary and advised him of his Miranda
rights, he replied that he "'wanted a lawyer before answering any questions.'" Id. at
678. Three days later, while Roberson was still in custody, a different officer ques-
tioned Roberson about a different burglary, unaware that Roberson had invoked his
right to counsel earlier. Id. After giving Roberson his rights again, "the officer ob-
tained an incriminating statement." Id. Both the trial court and the Arizona Supreme
Court agreed to suppress the statement. Id. at 678-79.
77. Id. at 687-88. "Whether a contemplated reinterrogation concerns the same or a
different offense, or whether the same or different law enforcement authorities are in-
volved in the second investigation, the same need to determine whether the suspect
has requested counsel exists." Id.
78. Id. at 683. "[T]he presumption raised by a suspect's request for counsel-that
he considers himself unable to deal with the pressures of custodial interrogation
without legal assistance-does not disappear simply because the police have ap-
proached the suspect, still in custody, still without counsel, about a separate investi-
gation." Id.
79. See id. at 687-88. The holding requires police to determine if a suspect has
already invoked his right to counsel, rather than shift the burden to the suspect to
inform the officers of his earlier invocation. Id. In addition, the holding does not
allow police to treat an invocation as only applying to the offense at hand; the Court
treats a suspect's invocation as covering aol offenses. Id. at 683.
80. If the Court follows its Roberson rationale of affirmatively protecting the right
to counsel, the Court would be consistent in deciding that ambiguous requests are
effective, which gives the benefit of the doubt to the suspect. At the very least, the
Court could require that police inquire into the ambiguous statement, which places
the burden on the police and not the suspect.
gave some indications of how it may decide the issue in the future.
These indications, however, imply different results.8'
B. State and Federal Court decisions
In contrast to the Supreme Court, the state and federal courts have
directly addressed the issue of ambiguous requests for counsel. The
various lower courts have adopted one of three approaches. The first is
a per se approach, based on the "in any manner" language of Miranda,
which states that a suspect's ambiguous or equivocal requests are suffi-
cient to invoke the right to counsel, and therefore, all questioning must
stop.82 The second is a clarification approach, which requires the po-
lice to stop the interrogation and clarify the suspect's ambiguous re-
quest by only asking questions directed toward the clarification.' The
third, and most conservative approach, allows the police to continue
interrogating a suspect and ignore the suspect's ambiguous request for
counsel.'
Some federal and state courts adopt the per se approach,' whereby
police must stop all questioning when a suspect makes an ambiguous
request for counsel. Maglio v. Jago' and People v. Superior Court7 il-
lustrate the rationale behind the per se approach.
In Maglio, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the suspect's
ambiguous statement, "'[m]aybe I should have an attorney,'" invoked his
right to counsel.' Recognizing that some requests may be equivocal,
the Sixth Circuit looked to the language in Miranda for the answer.'
The Sixth Circuit asserted that the "in any manner" language of
Miranda implies that any attempt to invoke the right to counsel is an
81. See supra notes 29-80 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 85-100 and accompanying text
83. See infra notes 101-22 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 123-34 and accompanying text
85. See, e.g., Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978); People v. Superior
Court, 542 P.2d 1390 (Cal. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976); People v. Plyler,
272 N.W.2d 623, 626 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) ("An ambiguous indication of an interest
in having counsel requires cessation of police interrogation."); Ochoa v. State, 573
S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
86. 580 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978). Police took Maglio, a 16-year-old runaway, to the
station for questioning about a murder. Id. at 202-03. The police advised Maglio of
his Miranda rights and then asked him if he would waive those rights. Id. at 203.
After Maglio replied, "'Maybe I should have an attorney,'" the police continued the
interrogation. Id. Subsequently, Maglio confessed. Id.
87. 542 P.2d 1390 (Cal. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976).
88. Maglio, 580 F.2d at 203-04.
89. Id. at 205. The Sixth Circuit stated that "[oif course, there are times when it is
not clear that a suspect is in fact asserting the right to counsel ...Miranda gives
some guidance." Id.
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effective invocation of the right to counsel.' Using this standard, the
Sixth Circuit found "little difficulty" in concluding that the suspect at-
tempted to assert his right to counsel." Once the suspect asserted this
right, the police must stop all questioning.92 Recognizing the risks of
coercion in a custodial interrogation, the Sixth Circuit adopted the per
se bar to protect suspects who make ambiguous requests for counsel. 3
In People v. Superior Court,4 the California Supreme Court adopted
a similar standard for ambiguous requests. The court held that both the
statement, "'I guess we need a lawyer,'" and the police's affirmative re-
sponse to the question, "'[d]o you think we need an attorney?'" were
sufficient to invoke the right to counsel. 5 Using an analysis similar to
Maglio, the court relied on the "Miranda mandate" of allowing invoca-
tion "in any manner."' The court stated that a suspect does not have
to use any "particular form of words or conduct" to invoke the right to
counsel.97 A requirement that a suspect must make an unequivocal re-
90. Id. The Sixth Circuit referred to Miranda as "mandating that questioning must
stop if the defendant indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that
he wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking." Id. (emphasis added) (quot-
ing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966)).
91. Id.
92. Id. The Sixth Circuit relied on Miranda and on Mosley, which "strongly sug-
gest that there is a per se rule barring custodial interrogation of a suspect after a
request for counsel has been made." Id. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474; Michigan v.
Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 110 n.2 (1075) (White, J., concurring)). Since the police contin-
ued interrogating Maglio, they violated his Miranda rights, and therefore the court
must suppress all evidence obtained after the invocation. Id. at 207-09.
93. The Sixth Circuit noted that "[t]he only plausible object of [the police's] contin-
ued questioning was to break down the suspect's attempt to assert his rights and
elicit a confession." Id. at 205. The Sixth Circuit also indicated that the suspect was
only 16 years old and confused about his rights. Id. at 206-07.
94. 542 P.2d 1390 (Cal. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 816 (1976). After questioning
the two suspects and advising them of their Miranda rights, a police officer told the
suspects that he thought the suspects were guilty. Id. at 1391-92. One of the suspects
then said either "'I guess we need a lawyer'" or "'[d]o you think we need an attor-
ney?'" Id. at 1392. The police replied affirmatively and added that the suspects "could
make the officers' jobs 'easy' or 'tough.'" Id. After leaving the suspects alone for five
or ten minutes, the police officers returned and asked the suspects if "they had made
any decisions." Id. The suspects then confessed. Id.
95. Id. at 1395. Each statement by itself invoked the right to counsel, even though
both were equivocal or ambiguous requests. Id.
96. Id. at 1394 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45).
97. Id. at 1394-95 (quoting People v. Randall, 464 P.2d 114, 118 (Cal. 1970)). In
declaring that "a suspect need not make an express statement that he wishes to in-
voke his Fifth Amendment privilege [and] 'no particular form of words or conduct is
quest would "'subvert Miranda's prophylactic intent.'"98 Since the
suspects' statements sufficiently invoked their right to counsel, the
police violated their rights when they continued the questioning.9 Even
though the per se bar rule seems reasonable in light of Miranda's "in
any manner" language, only a minority of courts adopt this ap-
proach."°
The majority of federal and state courts follow the clarification ap-
proach, which requires officers to immediately stop the interrogation
and limit further inquiry to only clarifying the suspect's wishes when
the suspect makes an ambiguous request for counsel.'0 ' In 1979, the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Nash v. Estelle, 2 was the first to
adopt this approach. 3 The district court found that Nash adequately
invoked his right to counsel when he said, "'I would like to talk to a
lawyer, but I'd rather talk to you.'"'" In reversing the district court's
necessary,'" the court clearly rejected the approach requiring unequivocal statements
to invoke the right to counsel. Id. at 1395.
98. Id. at 1395 (quoting Randall, 464 P.2d at 118). The court further showed its
position on unambiguous requests when it stated that "to demand that it [the privi-
lege] be invoked with unmistakable clarity (resolving any ambiguity against the de-
fendant) would subvert Miranda's prophylactic intent." Id. (emphasis added) (quoting
Randall, 464 P.2d at 118).
99. Id. All questioning must stop even when a suspect makes an ambiguous re-
quest for counsel. Id.
100. For a list of representative cases, see supra note 85.
101. See, e.g., United States v. March, 999 F.2d 456 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 483 (1993); United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467 (lth Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 436 (1992); Howard v. Pung, 862 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Fouche, 833 F.2d 1284
(9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (5th
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979); United States v. Riggs, 537 F.2d
1219 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Weston, 519 F. Supp. 565 (W.D.N.Y. 1981); Unit-
ed States v. Chansriharaj, 446 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Collins v. Fogg, 425 F.
Supp. 1339 (E.D.N.Y), affd, 559 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 869 (1977);
People v. Benjamin, 732 P.2d 1167 (Colo. 1987); Crawford v. State, 580 A.2d 571 (Del.
1990); Martinez v. State, 564 So. 2d 1071 (Fla. 1990); Cannady v. State, 427 So. 2d
723 (Fla. 1983); State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217 (Minn. 1988); State v. Robtoy, 653
P.2d 284 (Wash. 1982) (en banc).
102. 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979).
103. Police arrested Nash and advised him of his Miranda rights. Id. at 514-15.
During the interrogation, Nash said, "'I would like to have a lawyer, but I'd rather
talk to you.'" Id. at 516. The interrogating officer then tried to determine Nash's
wishes by telling him that if he wanted a lawyer, the officer would stop talking to
him. Id. Nash replied, "'No, I would rather talk to you.'" Id. at 517. The officer then
asked, "'You do not want to have a lawyer here right now?'" to which Nash replied,
"'No.'" Id. The officer further inquired if Nash was "'absolutely certain'" and Nash
replied in the affirmative. Id. Nash then signed a confession. Id. at 515.
104. Id. at 516-17. This is obviously an ambiguous request for counsel since it
states both a willingness to have an attorney present and a willingness to continue
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ruling, the Fifth Circuit adopted the approach that "[w]here the
suspect's desires are expressed in... an equivocal fashion, it is permis-
sible for the questioning official to make further inquiry to clarify the
suspect's wishes." °"
First, the Fifth Circuit quoted two previous Supreme Court cases to
support its standard."° The Fifth Circuit claimed that Miranda itself
advocated the position that officers may be required to determine the
suspect's true intent when he makes an ambiguous request for coun-
sel.'O7 The Fifth Circuit then relied on the language of Mosley to argue
that a "blanket prohibition" would both unnecessarily hinder legitimate
police investigations and 'deprive suspects of the chance to choose
whether their best interests would be served in talking to the police."°
Second, the court indicated that fairness requires police to clarify an
ambiguous request for counsel."° When a suspect indicates that he is
willing to continue talking, "it is sound and fully constitutional police
practice to clarify" the suspect's wishes."' However, the Fifth Circuit
realized the danger that some officers may use clarifying questions to
the interrogation.
105. Id. at 517. In adopting the clarification approach, the Fifth Circuit expressly
rejected the per se bar rule, which the district court used in its ruling. Id. The court
found that a statement that "expresses both a desire for counsel and a desire to
continue the interview without counsel" is ambiguous. Id. The Fifth Circuit also
warned that merely using the word "lawyer" should not automatically invoke the right
to counsel because "[i]f the word 'lawyer' were to be endowed with talismanic quali-
ties," police would have to stop the interrogation when a suspect utters even the
word "lawyer." Id. at 519.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 517. The Miranda Court stated that "[i]f (a suspect) is indecisive in his
request for counsel, there may be some question on whether he did or did not waive
counsel. Situations of this kind must necessarily be left to the judgment of the inter-
viewing Agent" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 485 (1966)).
108. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975)). In Mosley, the Court
asserted that a "blanket prohibition against the taking of voluntary statements or a
permanent immunity from further interrogation, regardless of the circumstances,
would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irrational obstacles to legitimate
police activity, and deprive suspects of an opportunity to make informed and intelli-
gent assessments of their interests." Mosley, 423 U.S. at 102.
109. Nash, 597 F.2d at 517.
110. Id. To end the interrogation even when a suspect wishes it to continue is not
fair to the suspect, because it goes against what the suspect wants. If the suspect
actually wants an attorney, however, the police must immediately end the interroga-
tion. See id. This appears to be the most logical approach.
coerce or intimidate a suspect."' Therefore, a trial court must look at
all the circumstances to determine if the police infringed a suspect's
"continuing option to cut off the interview.""2 The Fifth Circuit im-
posed a clear restriction on police actions and questions after a suspect
makes an ambiguous request for counsel."' The Tenth Circuit required
that "[tihese clarifying questions must be purely ministerial, not ad-
versarial, and cannot be designed to influence the subject not to invoke
his rights."
4
Numerous state courts have adopted the clarification approach."5 In
State v. Robtoy,"' the Washington Supreme Court held that "[ainy
questioning after the equivocal assertion of the right to counsel must be
strictly confined to clarifying the suspect's request." 7 The court stated
that this approach appeared to be the "most reasonable" and provided
the suspect with proper protection, while not "unduly burdening the
police.""' The Delaware Supreme Court adopted this approach for
somewhat different reasons in Crawford v. State."' The court relied
on Smith, which required a two-step test to determine if statements are
admissible under Miranda.2' The first part required the court to "de-
111. Id. at 517-18. The Fifth Circuit emphasized that "[tlhis is not to say that an
interrogating officer may utilize the guise of clarification as a subterfuge for coercion
or intimidation." Id.
112. Id. at 518.
113. See id.
114. United States v. March, 999 F.2d 456, 461-62 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 483 (1993). The court in March held that "when confronted with an equivocal re-
quest for counsel, the interrogating officers must cease all substantive questioning and
limit further inquires to clarifying the subject's ambiguous statements." Id. at 461
(citing Parker v. Singletary, 974 F.2d 1562 (11th Cir. 1992)).
115. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
116. 653 P.2d 284 (Wash. 1982) (en banc). After being advised of his Miranda
rights, the suspect said, "'Maybe I should call my attorney.'" Id. at 286. The police
attempted to clarify the request and determined that Robtoy did not want to invoke
his right to counsel. Id. at 286-87. Robtoy subsequently confessed. Id. at 287.
117. Id. at 290.
118. Id. The court warned that if it adopted a per se bar rule, the "mere mention
by the suspect of the word 'attorney' [would take] on talismanic significance." Id.
The clarification approach "gives a suspect the proper amount of protection to his
rights without unduly burdening the police from taking voluntary statements." Id.; see
People v. Benjamin, 732 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Colo. 1987) (advocating the clarification
approach because it "strikes an appropriate balance between the interests of the de-
fendant and those of the prosecution"); State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 223 (Minn.
1988) (declaring that the clarification approach "is more reasonable, pragmatic and
fairer to the accused as well as the state than the 'per se bright line' approach, or
the less precise 'totality of the circumstances' analysis").
119. 580 A.2d 571 (Del. 1990).
120. Id. (citing Smith v. Iliinois. 496 U.S. 91, 95 (1984)); see supra notes 51-61 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 23: 607, 1996] Davis v. United States
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
termine whether the defendant actually invoked his right to
counsel.'' The Delaware Supreme Court held that the clarification
approach was the best way to make this determination.
22
In contrast to the vast weight of authority advocating the clarification
approach,"u only a few jurisdictions adopt the third approach, which
allows police to ignore a suspect's ambiguous request for counsel.
24
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in People v. Krueger2" exempli-
fied the reasons for this approach. Both the trial court and the appellate
court held that Krueger's statement indicating that he might need an
attorney did not "constitute a request for counsel under Miranda."'26
In affirming the appellate court, the Illinois Supreme Court asserted
that not all vague or ambiguous references to an attorney effectively
invoke a suspect's Miranda right to counsel.'27 The court also relied
121. Id. (citing Smith, 496 U.S. at 95). The second part requires that once the first
part is answered, statements are only admissible if "the defendant initiated further
discussion, and . . . knowingly and intelligently waived the right to have an attorney
present" Id. (citing Smith, 496 U.S. at 95).
122. Id. at 576-77. If a court must first determine if a suspect actually invoked the
right to counsel, clarifying an ambiguous request seems to be the obvious standard to
use.
123. See supra note 101.
124. See, e.g., People v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537 (111. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
1019 (1981); State v. Johnson, 318 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa) (en banc), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 848 (1982); State v. Phillips, 563 S.W.2d 47 (Mo. 1978), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 904
(1979); Lee v. State, 560 P.2d 226 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977).
125. 412 N.E.2d 537 (Il. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981). Police arrested
Krueger and advised him of his Miranda rights. Id. at 538. After he signed a waiver-
of-rights form, three officers began their interrogation. Id. At some point in the inter-
view, Krueger said that he might need a lawyer, but continued talking to the officers.
Id. at 538-39. Shortly thereafter, Krueger signed a confession. Id. at 539. Krueger
sought to suppress the confession, claiming that he had adequately invoked his right
to counsel so that the police violated his Miranda rights when they continued the
interrogation. Id. at 538.
126. Id. at 539. The record indicated some confusion as to what Krueger said ex-
actly, but the statements testified to by the three officers were essentially identical.
Id. at 538. Krueger said either, "'[m]aybe I ought to have an attorney,'" "'[m]aybe I
need a lawyer'" or "'[mlaybe I ought to talk to an attorney.'" Id. These are all clearly
ambiguous requests for counsel.
127. Id. at 539-40. The court expressed that not "every reference to an attorney, no
matter how vague, indecisive or ambiguous, should constitute an invocation of the
right to counsel." Id. The court did look at other factors, including the fact that the
defendant had normal intelligence, understood and waived his Miranda rights, volun-
tarily talked to the police without evidence of coercion or duress, and was only in-
terrogated for a short time. Id.
on Miranda to allow the individual officers to use their subjective judg-
ment in determining whether a suspect has invoked his right to coun-
sel."' Therefore, the court adopted the position that ambiguous re-
quests do not invoke the right to counsel, but does allow police officers
to determine the suspect's ambiguous intent.'29 In its holding, the
court distinctly and expressly rejected the per se bar rule.'30
Other courts adopting this approach have looked at the "totality of
circumstances" to determine whether a suspect intended to request an
attorney when the request was ambiguous. In Kapocsi v. State,3' the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that the suspect's ambiguous
request did not indicate a present desire for an attorney based on the
surrounding circumstances.3 2 Similarly, the Texas Court of Appeals
found that a suspect who stated that he "was trying to contact an attor-
ney" did not invoke his right to counsel in Clausen v. State." In rely-
ing on a "totality of the circumstances" test to rebut the presumption of
invocation, the court essentially allowed the officers to ignore the
suspect's ambiguous request if they determined that the suspect did not
intend to invoke his right to counsel."a
Since the lower courts have adopted these various standards to han-
dle an ambiguous request for counsel, the judicial community looked
eagerly toward the Supreme Court's decision in Davis v. United
128. Id. (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 486 n.55 (1966)). Even though a
police officer's belief of a suspect's intent is not dispositive, "the officers must be al-
lowed to exercise their judgment in determining whether a suspect has requested
counsel." Id. (emphasis added).
129. Id. This differs from the clarification approach in that there is no requirement
that police clarify.
130. Id. The court stated, "We hold that the officers did not violate defendant's
Miranda rights, for . . . a more positive indication or manifestation of a desire for
an attorney was required than was made here." Id.
131. 668 P.2d 1157 (Okla. Crim. App. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1070 (1984). After
police arrested and advised him of his Miranda rights, Kapocsi said, "'I'm thinking I
will need a lawyer.'" Id. at 1159 n.1. When police continued their interrogation,
Kapocsi made incriminating statements. Id. at 1159-60.
132. Id. In looking at the "totality of the circumstances," the court found that
Kapocsi voluntarily continued talking to the officers and that he actually requested an
attorney for trial, not for the interrogation. Id. at 1159 n.3.
133. 682 S.W.2d 328, 331 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1021 (1986).
After police arrested Clausen, an officer advised him of his Miranda rights. Id. at
331. Clausen told the officer that he "was trying to contact an attorney." Id. After
the officer asked Clausen several times if he understood his rights, Clausen voluntari-
ly gave incriminating statements. Id.
134. Id. "The court should not presume that any effort to contact an attorney repre-
sents the invocation of the right to counsel if the totality of circumstances rebuts the
presumption." Id. (citing Gorel v. United States, 531 F. Supp. 368, 372 (S.D. Tex.
1981)). The court found that "[a]ll of the circumstances surrounding appellant's ques-
tioning indicate that he . . .did not want counsel at that time." Id.
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States." Davis finally provided the Court the opportunity to settle the
issue of ambiguous requests for counsel.
III. FACTS OF THE CASE
On November 4, 1988, the Naval Investigative Service (NIS) interro-
gated petitioner Davis as a suspect in the killing of a fellow enlisted
sailor on October 2, 1988."6 NIS agents brought petitioner, who had
spent over a week in isolation in a psychiatric ward, to the NIS office,
where the agents handcuffed him to a chair. ' 7 Before questioning be-
gan, the agents read Davis his Miranda rights.'" After Davis waived
the right to remain silent and the right to have an attorney present,
both, orally and in writing, the agents initiated the interrogation.3 '
After about an hour and a half of questioning, Davis stated, "'Maybe I
should talk to a lawyer.'"'40 The agents stopped their questioning about
the killing and proceeded to ascertain the meaning of Davis's state-
ment.' The agents told Davis that they would stop all questioning if
they could clarify that Davis's statement was actually a request for
counsel and not just a comment.' Davis replied that he was not ask-
ing for a lawyer and continued by stating that he did not want a law-
yer.' The agents resumed questioning about the murder." After an-
other hour of interrogation, Davis said, "'I think I want a lawyer before
135. 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994).
136. Id. at 2353.
137. Reply Brief at 4-5, Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350 (1994) (No. 92-1949).
138. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353. The agents told petitioner that he was a suspect in
the killing and that he had the right to remain silent, that anything he said could be
used against him in a court-martial trial, that he had a right to talk to an attorney,




142. Id. One of the agents testified that:
We made it very clear that we're not here to violate his rights, that if he
wants a lawyer, then we will stop any kind of questioning with him, that we
weren't going to pursue the matter unless we have it clarified is he asking
for a lawyer or is he just making a comment about a lawyer.
United States v. Davis, 36 M.J. 337, 340 (1993) (brackets omitted), affd, 114 S. Ct.
2350 (1994).
143. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353.
144. Id.
I say anything else.'""4 5 Immediately, the agents ceased all question-
ing.1
46
At his trial, a general court-martial, Davis moved to suppress the
statements made during the last hour of interrogation, claiming that his
mention of a lawyer should have invoked his right to counsel.'4 7 The
military judge denied the motion and convicted Davis of murder.'"
The Navy-Marine Corps Court of Military Review granted review.'
The court held that because Davis's statement was not an unequivocal
request for counsel, the agents were justified in asking clarifying ques-
tions."u After commenting that the Supreme Court has not settled the
issue of ambiguous requests for counsel, the court adopted the ap-
proach that an ambiguous statement must be clarified before question-
ing can continue. 5'
Recognizing the opportunity to finally resolve this issue on the mer-
its, the Court granted certiorari on November 1, 1993.52
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. Justice O'Connor's Majority Opinion"
In holding that police can ignore an ambiguous request for counsel,
the Court relied primarily on the need for effective law enforcement."u
The Court began its analysis by stating that the Constitution protects a
person's right to counsel during custodial interrogation.'55 The Court
in Miranda established this right as a safeguard to protect a person's
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.' In recognizing that
145. Davis, 36 M.J. at 340.
146. Id.
147. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2353.
148. Id.
149. Id.; see Davis, 36 M.J. at 337.
150. Davis, 36 M.J. at 341. The court recognized the three approaches to ambiguous
requests for counsel followed by various jurisdictions. Id. at 34142; see supra notes
82-135 and accompanying text.
151. Davis, 36 M.J. at 341-42.
152. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2354, cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 379 (1993).
153. Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Id. at 2352.
154. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356. The Court unanimously held that police are not re-
quired to stop all questioning when a suspect makes an equivocal request for coun-
sel. Id.
155. Id. at 2354. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a person the right to counsel at
the start of an adversary criminal proceeding. Id. (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI).
156. Id. The Court stated that "[tihe right to counsel established in Miranda was
one of a series of recommended procedural safeguards . . . [that] were not them-
selves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that
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the right to counsel is "sufficiently important to suspects in criminal
investigations," the Court reaffirmed the Edwards rule that police must
stop questioning whenever a suspect requests an attorney even if the
suspect had earlier waived his Miranda rights.' The rule is "designed
to prevent police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previous-
ly asserted Miranda rights."" However, after explaining the impor-
tance of the Edwards rule, the Court qualified the rationale by reiterat-
ing that the rule is not a Constitutional right,'59 but rather one that is
"justified only by reference to its prophylactic purpose. " "
In applying the Edwards rule, the Court required an objective stan-
dard in determining if a suspect has requested the right for counsel. 6'
The Court relied on McNeil v. Wisconsin, stating that the request
"requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be con-
strued to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attor-
ney."" However, the Court seemed to make a liberal conclusion
based on the McNeil holding when it said that, "if a suspect makes a
reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a rea-
sonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood
only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our prece-
dents do not require the cessation of questioning."" From this asser-
tion, the Court concluded that a suspect must make an unambiguous
request for an attorney to invoke the Miranda right to counsel." Fur-
the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected." Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443-44 (1974)).
157. Id. at 2354-55. The Court referred to this rule as the "second layer of prophy-
laxis for the Miranda right to counsel." Id. at 2355 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501
U.S. 171, 176 (1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 350 (1990)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
159. Id. The right does not attach to the Fifth Amendment's right against self-in-
crimination. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
160. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 528
(1987)).
161. Id. (citing Barrett, 479 U.S. at 52).
162. 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
163. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178
(1991)).
164. Id. (citing McNeil, 501 U.S. at 178; Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485
(1981)).
165. Id. The Court supported this statement by stating that "a statement either is
such an assertion of the right to counsel or it is not." Id. (quoting Smith v. Illinois,
469 U.S. 91, 97-98 (1984)).
thermore, based on its cited precedents, the Court concluded that a
suspect "must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently
clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would un-
derstand the statement to be a request for an attorney. If the statement
fails to meet the requisite level of clarity, Edwards does not require
that the officers stop questioning the suspect."'" With this language,
the Court expressly adopted the position that officers are not required
to stop the interrogation when the suspect ambiguously requests coun-
sel.1
67
In dismissing Davis's contention that police must stop questioning a
suspect when the suspect makes an ambiguous request for counsel, the
Court relied on the rationale behind the Edwards rule that police must
stop the interrogation when a suspect requests an attorney." As the
Court noted, however, a rule that police must stop the interrogation
when they cannot determine if a suspect has even requested his right to
an attorney "would transform the Miranda safeguards into wholly irra-
tional obstacles to legitimate police investigative activity"" by pre-
venting police from continuing their interrogation even when a suspect
does not want an attorney present.' To support its holding, the Court
noted that it has previously stated that police officers are not required
to stop questioning when a suspect makes an ambiguous request for
counsel. 7'
After relying on past Court rulings to support its holding, the ,Court
fortified its argument by making its own observations in favor of the
rule.7 The focal point of the argument is the "need for effective law
enforcement," which the Court stated is the "other side of the Miranda
equation."' If police are required to stop and determine whether a
suspect requested counsel, the Court asserted that police will have to
make "difficult judgment calls" that could affect the suppression of
evidence.'74 Consequently, this would hinder the police investigative
166. Id. The Court quoted Moran v. Burbine: "[Tlhe interrogation must cease until
an attorney is present only [i]f the individual states that he wants an attorney." 475
U.S. 412, 433 n.4 (1986). The Court seemed to be stating that this mandates an un-
equivocal request, which may be reading more into the statement than was intended.
167. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2355.
168. Id. at 2355-56.
169. Id. (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102 (1975)).
170. Id. at 2356. The Court noted that Edwards does not require that a lawyer be
present when a suspect agrees to answer questions without a lawyer. Id.
171. Id. The Court quoted Miranda's language that "if a suspect is 'indecisive in his
request for counsel,' the officers need not always cease questioning." Id. (quoting
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process since the police would no longer have an easily applied bright-
line test. 75 The Court was also unwilling to add a "third layer of pro-
phylaxis" to the Miranda rights, stating that giving a suspect the right
to have an attorney present during custodial interrogations and requir-
ing police to immediately stop questioning when a suspect requested
counsel was enough to protect a suspect's Miranda rights.
76
The Court concluded by addressing the concern that its holding fails
to protect the rights of suspects who are not able to clearly assert their
right to counsel, but who still desire an attorney.'7 7 This group in-
cludes persons who are afraid or intimidated by the police, those who
lack adequate communication skills, or those affected by any other
means to the extent that they cannot clearly assert their intentions.78
The Court quickly dismissed this important issue by stating that the
principal policy behind Miranda rights-protection against coercion
and self-incrimination--is protected when the suspect is initially made
fully aware of his right to remain silent and right to counsel. 79 Fur-
thermore, Edwards provides an additional layer of protection by allow-
ing the suspect to immediately cease the interrogation, even after he
initially waives his right to counsel." These two layers are sufficient
to protect a suspect's rights since they meet Miranda's primary policy
goal.'
18
The Court did recognize that requiring police to clarify ambiguous
requests for counsel is "good police practice" because it minimizes the
chances that evidence obtained after the request would be suppressed
175. Id.
176. Id. at 2356-57. The Court reasoned the two layers are enough to protect the
suspect. The issue in this case, however, involved the second layer, i.e., how do po-
lice know when a suspect requests counsel. Therefore, determining whether a request
has occurred is inherent in this second layer and is not really a third layer.
177. Id. at 2356.
178. Id.
179. Id. The Court relied on a previous holding in stating: "'[Flull comprehension of
the rights to remain silent and request an attorney [is] sufficient to dispel whatever
coercion is inherent in the interrogation process.'" Id. (quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412, 427 (1986)).
180. Id. This added layer of protection is only obtained when the request for coun-
sel is "affirmatively invoked by the suspect." Id.
181. Id. In this brief paragraph of the Court's opinion, the Court implied that if a
suspect understands and waives his initial Miranda rights, that removes the danger of
coercion or self-incrimination, even for a suspect who may not assert an unambigu-
ous request for counsel because he has "indicated his willingness to deal with the
police unassisted." Id.
if the request does not turn out to be ambiguous." However, the
Court declined to adopt a rule requiring police to ask clarifying ques-
tions and reiterated its holding that police can continue questioning
when a suspect makes an ambiguous request for counsel. l
The Court also addressed the issue of whether 18 U.S.C. § 3501
should apply to this case, but relegated the discussion to a footnote."
The statute appeared to apply since it "govern[s] the admissibility of
confessions in federal prosecutions." The statute provides that "a
confession... shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily
given." Relying on two principal arguments, the. Court quickly dis-
missed this issue.'87 First, since the parties did not dispute the Court
of Military Appeals holdings that previous Court cases regarding the
Fifth Amendment apply to the admissibility of evidence obtained in
military interrogations for court-martial trials, the Court presumed
that its holdings apply equally to military court-martial trials. Sec-
ond, since the Government did not rely on the statute, the Court did
not require itself to interpret the statute.'4
B. Justice Scalia's Concurring Opinion
While agreeing with the Court's opinion, Justice Scalia found that the
Court should not have brushed aside the issue of applying 18 U.S.C. §
3501 to this case by stating that "[lI]egal analysis of the admissibility of a
confession without reference to these provisions [18 U.S.C. § 3501] is
equivalent to legal analysis of the admissibility of hearsay without con-
sulting the Rules of Evidence; it is an unreal exercise." 9'
182. Id.
183. Id. The Court clearly acknowledged the approach advocated by the dissent, but
it seemed confident that .the Edward's rule sufficiently protects the suspect's rights.
184. Id. at 2354 n.*.
185. Id. (quoting United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 114 S. Ct. 1599, 1600 (1994)) (in-
ner quotation marks omitted).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1988) (emphasis added). The trial judge determines
voluntariness by looking at all the circumstances surrounding the confession. 18
U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1988).
187. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2354 n.*.
188. Id. (citing United States v. McLaren, 38 M.J. 112, 115 (1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1056 (1994); United States v. Applewhite, 23 M.J. 196, 198 (1987)).
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 2357 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia addressed the logic of the
Court's reason for refusing to consider the statutes applicability to the case at bar as
follows: "The Court today bases its refusal to consider § 3501 not upon the fact that
the provision is inapplicable, but upon the fact that the Government failed to argue
it." Id. n.* (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Justice Scalia noted that dismissing issues not raised is not a statuto-
ry or constitutional requirement, but rather just a "sound prudential
practice.""9 Justice Scalia, however, argued that the Court should con-
sider this issue because the Court would be neglecting its duty if it did
not.'9" Justice Scalia acknowledged the Executive's power to avoid ap-
plying the statute by not introducing evidence that would be allowed
under the statute, but Justice Scalia found that the Executive has nei-
ther the right nor power to determine what objections are allowed once
the evidence is introduced.'" At this point in the proceeding, the stat-
ute is a "provision of law directed to the courts," and thus, courts
should determine its applicability in admitting the evidence. '
Justice Scalia expressed two concerns about the Court's continual
refusal to apply the statute to federal prosecutions.9' First, the Court
may be wasting its time in reviewing these cases because they might
not even involve Miranda issues.'97 Second, and the bigger concern of
the two, is the danger of allowing many dangerous criminals to go free
and harm the people."8 Since the statute requires a lower standard for
admissibility of confessions than Miranda, many admissible confessions
in federal' prosecutions may be excluded when applied to the higher
Miranda standards."9 As a result, criminals who would be convicted
192. Id. at 2358 (Scalia, J., concurring).
193. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). "We shirk our duty if we systematically disregard
that statutory command simply because the Justice Department systematically declines
to remind us of it." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia asserted that the
voluntariness requirement for the admissibility of confessions provided in Miranda
has its equivalence in 18 U.S.C. § 3501 for federal criminal prosecutions, and
therefore, the Court should not ignore this statute just because the Government con-
tinually refuses to raise it before the Court. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
194. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
195. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). The statute "reflect[s] the people's assessment of
the proper balance to be struck between concern for persons interrogated in custody
and the needs of effective law enforcement." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
196. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
197. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). 18 U.S.C. § 3501 would apply instead of Miranda
holdings. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
198. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia warned that refusing to apply the
federal statute would allow "many dangerous felons ... to continue their depreda-
tions upon our citizens." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
199. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). The statute only requires that the confession be
voluntarily given, looking at all the circumstances including Miranda warnings. See
supra note 178 and accompanying text. However, Miranda is not controlling; there-
fore, a confession is admissible even if there is a Miranda violation so long as the
confession is voluntarily given. Id. For cases falling under Miranda requirements,
under 18 U.S.C. § 3501 may be freed if the court applied the unneces-
sary and higher Miranda standard.2" The public will not accept this
result if it can be reasonably avoided."' Justice Scalia, therefore, stat-
ed that the Court has an obligation to consider the applicability of the
statute, which "is consistent with the Third Branch's obligation to de-
cide according to the law."0'
C. Justice Souter's Opinion Concurring in the Judgment2 °-
Justice Souter, along with three other Justices, agreed with the
majority's view that police need not cease all questioning when con-
fronted with an ambiguous request for counsel, but disagreed that po-
lice can continue their interrogation when a suspect has made an am-
biguous request.2" Instead, the four Justices advocated requiring po-
lice to ask only clarifying questions in response to ambiguous requests
for counsel.2"5 In supporting the policy of requiring police to clarify a
suspect's ambiguous request for counsel before the interrogation may
continue, Justice Souter began his argument by relying on previous
lower court decisions and law enforcement briefs.2" Justice Souter
indicated that most of the lower courts and many police opinions reject
the majority's holding.2 7 Requiring police to stop the interrogation and
however, any confession is inadmissible if it was obtained in violation of the
suspect's Miranda rights. See supra text accompanying note 19.
200. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2358 (Scalia, J., concurring).
201. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia stressed his point by reminding
the Court of the current "intense national concern about the problem of run-away
crime." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia contended that applying 18 U.S.C. §
3501 may alleviate this problem, while ignoring the relevance of the statute would
compound the problem. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
202. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
203. Justice Souter delivered the opinion, concurring only in the judgment, joined by
Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Ginsburg. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
204. Id. at 2359 (Souter, J., concurring).
205. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). This is the clarification approach, as opposed to
the majority's approach of ignoring ambiguous requests.
206. Id. & nn.l-2 (Souter, J., concurring).
207. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). A "majority of the many courts" and "a consider-
able body of law enforcement officials" that addressed the issue of ambiguous re-
quests for counsel all argued contrary to the majority's holding. Id. (Souter, J., con-
curring). In a footnote, Justice Souter listed several federal district court cases, in-
cluding United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971, 975 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v.
Fouche, 833 F.2d 1284, 1287 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017 (1988); Unit-
ed States v. Porter, 776 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1048 (1987); Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768, 771-72 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
Id. at 2359 n.1. (Souter, J., concurring). Additionally, Justice Souter listed some state
court cases, which he asserted are "similarly lopsided" against the majority's ap-
proach: People v. Benjamin, 732 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Colo. 1987), Crawford v. State, 580
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clarify a suspect's intent would conform to "concerns of fairness and
practicality," because this approach protects suspects who have not
made an unequivocal request for counsel from "fend[ing] for them-
selves.""n
Justice Souter then expanded on the "fairness and practicality" con-
cerns supporting the minority's approach.1" Justice Souter contended
that the Court should adopt an approach consistent with previous pre-
cedent because these two concepts have been well-settled for nearly
three decades.21 ° The Court previously settled the fairness concern by
"assur[ing] that the individual's right to choose between speech and
silence remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process"2 1
and the practicality concern settled such that "Miranda rules, intended
to operate in the real world, 'must be consistent with... practical reali-
ties.'" 2 Justice Souter advocated the minority approach because it
"fulfills both ambitions" by (1) assuring a suspect will be granted his
right to an attorney if he wants one even if he does not communicate it
clearly, and (2) alleviating the practical problems involved during com-
munications between suspect and police.2"3
After supporting the minority's approach, Justice Souter attacked the
majority's decision by arguing that it "does not fare so well" when mea-
sured against the two principles of fairness and practicality.2"4 In terms
K2d 571, 576-77 (Del. 1990), Martinez v. State, 564 So. 2d 1071, 1074 (Fla. 1990), and
State v. Robinson, 427 N.W.2d 217, 223 (Minn. 1988). Id. at 2359 n.1.
Justice Souter cited two law enforcement sources, one supporting the minority's
approach and the other refuting the majority's approach. Id. at 2359 n.2 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
208. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). Suspects who have made unambiguous requests for
counsel cannot be further interrogated without an attorney, while suspects who have
not made unambiguous requests are subject to continued interrogation, even when
they may have desired an attorney. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
209. Id. at 2360 (Souter, J., concurring).
210. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
211. Id. (citing Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 513, 528 (1987) (Souter, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966)).
212. Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 688
(1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
213. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). By requiring police to immediately stop the interro-
gation and clarify the suspect's intent behind an ambiguous request for counsel, the
suspect's rights will be guaranteed because of "real-world reasons why misunderstand-
ings arise . . .and real-world limitations on the capacity of police and trial courts to
apply fine distinctions and intricate rules." Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
214. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
of fairness, Justice Souter noted that the majority recognized it has
"single[d] out an odd group.., for the Court's demand of heightened
linguistic care."" Many of these suspects "lack... a confident com-
mand of the English language;" 21 6 "many are 'woefully ignorant,'"2"
"and many more will be sufficiently intimidated by the interrogation
process" that they will be unable to assertively communicate their in-
tentions.1 5 In light of these realities, the Court has not required a req-
uisite level of clarity to invoke the right to counsel in order to protect
these individual rights.21" As such, the Court has "'give[n] a broad,
rather than a narrow interpretation'" for requests for counsel22 and
"'indulge[d] every reasonable presumption"' that a suspect has not
waived his right to counsel.221
Justice Souter next attacked the majority's contention that there is a
distinction between a suspect's initial waiver of counsel and his later
attempts to reinvoke the right.2 22 The majority asserted that since a
suspect has shown his willingness to speak once he has waived his
initial rights, the risk of coercion is not as great; therefore, the suspect
must later make a clear request to reinvoke that right.223 Justice Souter
relied on Miranda's language "describ[ing] the object of the warning as
being to assure 'a continuous opportunity to exercise [the right of si-
lence]'" 24 and requiring questioning to stop "'at any stage of the pro-
cess that [the suspect] wishes to consult with an attorney."'2 Justice
215. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). This group consists of "suspects who may be
'thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through menacing police interrogation
procedures.'" Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457).
216. Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (citing United States v. De la Jara, 973 F.2d 746,
750 (9th Cir. 1992)).
217. Id. at 2361 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468).
218. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). In a footnote, Justice Souter supported this last
category by adding that "[s]ocial science confirms . . . that individuals who feel in-
timidated or powerless are more likely to speak in equivocal or nonstandard terms
when no ambiguity or equivocation is meant." Id. n.4. (Souter, J., concurring) (citing
WnAm M. O'BARR, LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE: LANGUAGE, POWER, AND STRATEGY IN THE
CoURTROOM 61-71 (1982)).
219. Id. at 2361 (Souter, J., concurring).
220. Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633
(1986); Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 (1987)).
221. Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938)). Justice Souter cited Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1051 (1983) (Powell,
J., concurring), which required a "knowing and intelligent waiver" to give up the right
to counsel. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
222. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
223. Id. at 2356.
224. Id. at 2361 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,
444 (1966)).
225. Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45).
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Souter suggested that "continuous opportunity" implies an unwavering
standard to invoke the right, and "at any stage" indicates that the stan-
dard should apply equally to initial, as well as later, stages of the inter-
rogation process.226
Justice Souter next attacked the Court's argument that it is accept-
able to continue questioning when an "indecisive" suspect requests an
attorneys because the initial Miranda warnings reduce the risk of coer-
cion.2 7 Again, Justice Souter relied on Miranda, which expressly
warned that a single advisement of a suspect's rights is not enough to
safeguard against coercive effects.228 Continuing with the fairness con-
cept, Justice Souter suggested that the majority's approach does not
protect the suspect under the intentions of the Fifth Amendment.22
Justice Souter worried that when the police ignore a suspect's requests,
the suspect may believe it is useless to try and invoke the right again,
and thus will confess in order to end the interrogation.2"
Justice Souter also disagreed that "a statement either is... an asser-
tion of the right to counsel or it is not."23" ' Referring to Smith, Justice
Souter noted that the Court previously acknowledged that a suspect
could effectively invoke request for counsel even if the request was
ambiguous.232 Consequently, Justice Souter advocated the minority's
226. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
227. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 2361-62 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 469). "'[A]
once-stated warning, delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation cannot
itself suffice' to 'assure that the . . . right to choose between silence and speech re-
mains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.'" Id. (Souter, J., concurring)
(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. 469).
229. Id. at 2362 (Souter, J., concurring). The "real risk in the majority's approach,
go[es] close to the core of what the . . . Fifth Amendment provides." Id. (Souter, J.,
concurring). The Fifth Amendment's purpose is to protect suspects against self-incrim-
ination. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
230. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2362 (Souter, J., concurring). The danger is that "[wihen a
suspect understands his (expressed) wishes to have been ignored . . . , in contraven-
tion of the 'rights' just read to him by his interrogator, he may well see further ob-
jection as futile and confession (true or not) as the only way to end his interroga-
tion." Id. (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter made a strong argument. If his state-
ment were true, as common sense might suggest, a suspect, whether innocent or not,
could incriminate himself in contravention of his Fifth Amendment rights, even when
he desired the presence of counsel. At a minimum, Justice Souter's statement seems
to bear some truthfulness.
231. Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)
(quoting Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 97-98 (1984)).
232. Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Smith, 469 U.S. at 98). In Smith, the Court
approach by suggesting that "clarification is the intuitively sensible
course."
In addressing the majority's final fairness concern, Justice Souter
used only a few sentences.' While the majority emphasized the need
for "effective law enforcement," Justice Souter pointed out that the only
situation favoring the majority's rule is when a suspect who makes an
ambiguous request clearly asserts his right to counsel after clarification
of his request.2" In this situation, questioning must stop and the police
would lose the confession if required to follow the majority's rule."
Justice Souter stated that "Miranda itself determined" that society
should bear this price of lost confessions."'
Additionally, Justice Souter disagreed with the majority's argument
concerning the practicality factor, advocating that the minority rule is
more practical.2' Acknowledging that many requests will place law en-
forcement personnel in difficult situations, Justice Souter asserted that
the minority's rule will "relieve the officer of any responsibility for
guessing" the suspect's intentions." Furthermore, the minority's ap-
stressed that it has "neither denied the possibility that a reference to counsel could
be ambiguous . . . nor suggested that particular statements should be considered in
isolation." Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Smith, 469 U.S. at 98). Justice Souter
referred to Smith in order to indicate that, because the Court has not explicitly re-
quired an unequivocal request, nor required an ambiguous statement to be determined
by itself, the minority approach is more in line with this aspect of previous Court
precedents. See id.
233. Id. at 2363 (Souter, J., concurring). In a footnote, Justice Souter added some
support to his suggestion by stating that the Smith decision was quoted from the
same sentence in the Illinois Supreme Court opinion, which prescribed "'strictly' limit-
ed questioning" for ambiguous requests for counsel. Id. at 2362 n.6. (Souter, J., con-
curring) (citing People v. Smith, 102 m11. 2d 365, 375 (Simon, J., dissenting), rev'd, 469
U.S. 91 (1984)).
234. Id. at 2363 (Souter, J., concurring)
235. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
236. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
237. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). This argument seems to go to the core of rebutting
the majority's rationale. The majority says-that the need for effective law enforcement
to save "lost confessions" is addressed by their approach. See id. (Souter, J., concur-
ring). However, as Justice Souter counters, the very purpose of Miranda is to protect
suspects from making self-incriminating statements if they request counsel to be pres-
ent. See supra note 229 and accompanying text. Therefore, a suspect who truly de-
sires counsel should not be deprived of his Miranda rights simply because he ambig-
uously requests counsel.
238. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2363 (Souter, J., concurring).
239. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter cited several cases where Justices
disagree as to the ambiguity of a request for counsel. Id. at 2363 n.7 (Souter, J.,
concurring). Therefore, if Justices cannot agree on certain ambiguous requests, why
should the Court place that burden on the individual law enforcement officers, who,
presumably, have less knowledge about the requisite clarity than judges? See id.
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proach allowed the individual suspect to determine his own intent,
since he is the proper person to make the determination.
2 41
After rejecting the majority's approach and advocating the minority
rule, Justice Souter addressed the approach the petitioner advocated:
Police must stop all questioning when a suspect makes a request for
counsel, whether ambiguous or not.241 While acknowledging the dan-
ger of the minority's approach that clarifying questions may amount to
"badgering a suspect who wants counsel," Justice Souter countered
with the policy argument for respecting an individual's right of
choice.2 4 If the Court requires police to stop questioning even though
a suspect had intended to speak freely to the police without the pres-
ence of counsel, it would "disserve[]" this choice.4 This is also the
case where "[t]he costs to society of losing confessions would.., be
especially hard to bear" because police must now stop the interrogation
even when further questioning would clarify the suspect's desire to
waive his right to counsel.244
In a fairly extensive footnote, Justice Souter also suggested the ma-
jority had either misread or misinterpreted previous Court prece-
dents.2 4' Beginning with the Court's reliance on McNeil v.
Wisconsin,2" Justice Souter argued that McNeil did not even address
the clarity required to invoke the right to counsel, but only required
(Souter, J., concurring).
240. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). This seems the most logical approach, because if
an officer is not sure of a suspect's intent, the best way to ascertain the intent is to
directly ask the suspect through clarifying questions.
241. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). Petitioner's approach was the third of the three
different state and federal approaches. In terms of completeness, the minority opinion
was more thorough because it addressed all the approaches which courts have adopt-
ed. The majority opinion did not address this last view.
242. Id. at 2363-64. (Souter, J., concurring). Justice Souter expressed the policy as a
"strong bias in favor of individual choice." Id. at 2364 (Souter, J., concurring).
243. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
244. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
245. Id. at 2359-60 (Souter, J., concurring). This footnote appeared near the begin-
ning of Justice Souter's opinion. In it, Justice Souter first pointed out that the majori-
ty said that the Court has not decided the issue of ambiguous request, but then ar-
gued that its approach was "foreshadowed" by past Court precedents. Id. (Souter, J.,
concurring). This point does not seem particularly relevant since these statements did
not conflict with each other. The majority was simply stating that the issue was nev-
er fully addressed, but that past precedent has indicated support for the majority's
approach. Justice Souter could have simply discussed why the majority's cited cases
do not foreshadow the majority's approach.
246. 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
that the statement "can reasonably be construed" to be a request for
counsel.247 From only this, Justice Souter did not believe that McNeil
"foreshadowed" the majority's approach, as Justice O'Connor
claimed.24 Justice Souter next attacked the majority's interpretation of
Edwards v. Arizona,49 specifically the statement that police cannot
continue their interrogation when a suspect has "clearly asserted" his
right to counsel." Simply emphasizing "clearly asserted" does not de-
cide the issue of how clear a request must be to invoke the right to
counsel.25 ' All the Edwards rule stated was that police must imme-
diately stop the interrogation once a suspect clearly asserts his desire
for counsel.252
In the final argument of the footnote, Justice Souter rejected the
majority's contention that Miranda itself was a precursor to its ap-
proach as not "plausible." "2 Foremost in his argument was the fact
that the quoted passage was not even part of the Court's opinion, but
rather from an FBI response, read to the Court, inquiring about its then-
existing policies." Additionally, Justice Souter stated that the State-
ment in Miranda, suggesting that the interrogation can continue if a
request for counsel was "indecisive," is more in line with the minority's
approach than the majority's." Requiring police to ask clarifying ques-
tions follows more logically from the statement that a suspect who
makes an "indecisive" request may be "question[ed] on whether he did
or did not waive counsel" than does the approach of allowing police to
ignore the ambiguous request."
247. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2360 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting McNeil, 501 U.S.
at 178) (emphasis added). Justice Souter argued that since the issue of clarity was
not even addressed, the majority was mistaken in its reading that McNeil foreshad-
owed its approach. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). McNeil simply prohibited courts from
inferring from a suspect's silence that he intended to invoke his right to counsel. Id.
(Souter, J., concurring).
248. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
249. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
250. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2360 n.2 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Edwards, 451 U.S.
at 485).
251. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
252. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). The statement might be construed to say that inter-
rogation must stop only when a suspect clearly asserts the request. Nothing in Ed-
wards, however, seems to warrant this construction.
253. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
254. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). The letter was in response to a request by the
Solicitor General inquiring about procedures followed by the FBI in advising suspects
their rights and questioning after the rights are waived. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, 483-84 (1966).
255. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2360-61 n.3 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Miranda, 384
U.S. at 485).
256. Id. (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 485). The statement
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Relying on past precedent, Justice Souter concluded by declaring that
"[olur cases are best respected by a rule that" requires police officers to
clarify any ambiguous requests for counsel before the interrogation can
continue.
V. IMPACT OF THE COURT'S DECISION
The Court's decision in Davis surprised most observers. Based solely
on the weight of judicial precedent,"u most people probably expected
the Court to adopt the clarification approach. In addition to judicial
precedent, numerous law review articles have advocated the clarifica-
tion approach.259 Even experts in criminal law fully expected Davis to
is fairly vague. The passage in question is: "If [a suspect] is indecisive in his request
for counsel, there may be some question on whether he did or did not waive coun-
sel. Situations of this kind must necessarily be left to the judgment of the interview-
ing Agent" Miranda, 384 U.S. at 485 (emphasis added). There appear to be two pos-
sible meanings. One is that an indecisive request raises questions on whether the
suspect intended to waive counsel, that individual law enforcement personnel must
determine on a case-by-case basis. The other is that police may question to deter-
mine whether a suspect did or did not waive counsel. The first interpretation, which
the majori.ty accepts, seems more logical. The second interpretation seems less plausi-
ble since it interprets the word "question" to be a verb rather than a noun in the
context of the passage.
257. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2364 (Souter, J., concurring).
258. See supra note 101 and accompanying text A significant majority of state and
federal courts had adopted the clarification approach, while only a few had accepted
the standard adopted by Davis, allowing police to ignore ambiguous requests.
259. See, e.g., James J. Tomkovicz, Standards For Invocation And Waiver Of Coun-
sel In Confession Contexts, 71 IowA L. REV. 975 (1986); Matthew W. D. Bowman,
Note, The Right To Counsel During Custodial Interrogation: Equivocal References To
An Attorney -Determining What Statements Or Conduct Should Constitute An
Accused's Invocation Of The Right To Counsel, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1159 (1986); Rhonda
Y. Cline, Comment, Equivocal Requests For Counsel: A Balance Of Competing Police
Considerations, 55 U. CIN. L REV. 767 (1987); David Lavey, Comment, United States
v. Porter A New Solution To The Old Problem Of Miranda And Ambiguous Requests
For Counsel, 20 GA. L REV. 221 (1985); Charles R. Shreffler, Jr., Note, Judicial Ap-
proaches To The Ambiguous Request For Counsel Since Miranda v. Arizona, 62 NO-
TRE DAME L REV. 460 (1987); Charles J. Williams, Comment, Connecticut v. Barrett
And The Limited Invocation Of The Right To Counsel: A New Limitation Of Fifth
Amendment Miranda Protections, 73 IOWA L REV. 743 (1988). No law review articles
advocated the Davis Court's standard. Only one article did not advocate the clarifica-
tion approach; it suggested that the per se bar rule was the best standard for pro-
tecting a suspect's Fifth Amendment rights. See Ada Clapp, The Second Circuit
Adopts A Clarification Approach To Ambiguous Requests For Counsel: United States
v. Gotay, 56 BROOK. L REV. 511 (1990).
adopt the clarifying approach.2" Even though the result was unexpect-
ed, the lower courts had no choice but to follow the Court's precedent.
Therefore, when the Davis decision was announced, the lower courts
fell in line with the Court's mandated standard for federal law.26'
A. Effect on Police
Both law enforcement officials and those individuals under custodial
interrogation will feel the effects of Davis. The Court based its holding
on the "need for effective law enforcement."262 The Davis approach
will help the police function, but it may also hinder them as well.
Under Davis, police can operate under a bright line test and will no
longer be required to determine if an ambiguous request was actually a
request for counsel.2" With the previous majority approach requiring
clarification and the per se bar rule, any ambiguous request must be
classified as being either an ambiguous request for counsel or not an
ambiguous request for counsel. If the officers misclassify, subsequent
incriminating statements could be suppressed, leading to an acquit-
tal."2 However, with the Davis approach, police do not need to classi-
fy: they can ignore any ambiguous statement and continue their interro-
gation without fear that future statements will be suppressed."
260. See George E. Dix, Miranda's Time Is Up, TEXAS LAWYER, February 7, 1994, at
18 (stating that the Court "will almost certainly adopt" the clarification approach and
"Davis should be a relatively easy case for the court"). Dix is a noted criminal law
expert, the A. W. Walker Centennial Chair in Law at the University of Texas School
of Law, and a member of the Texas Lawyer Board of Contributors. Id.
261. See, e.g., United States v. Buckley, 36 F.3d 1106 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 1154 (1995); Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420 (11th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 1995 WL 125839; United States v. Sanchez, 866 F. Supp. 1542 (D. Kan. 1994);
Gentry v. State, 1994 WL 529410 (Ala Crim. App. Sept. 30, 1994); Deck v. State, 1995
WL 124353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th. Dist. Feb. 10, 1995); State v. Bailey, 1995 WL
29823 (Kan. Jan. 27, 1995); State v. Panetti, 1994 WL 622116 (Tex. Ct. App. Nov. 9,
1994).
262. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356. The Court's approach would create a "bright line
[test] than can be applied by officers in the real world of investigation without undu-
ly hampering the gathering of information." Id.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 167, 175.
264. With the clarifying approach, if the officer thinks the request is not an ambigu-
ous request for counsel, he is under no obligation to clarify. See supra text accompa-
nying note 101. However, if he is wrong, then the rule is violated and the suspect's
statements would be suppressed. Id. Similarly, with the per se bar rule, if the officer
misclassifies an ambiguous request for counsel as just an ambiguous request and con-
tinues the interrogation, the suspect's statements will again be inadmissible. See supra
text accompanying note 85.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 174-75.
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On its face, Davis would not appear to provide any significant im-
provement because classification would not seem to be much of a prob-
lem, i.e., either the request is clear or it contains some ambiguities.
Ambiguities can usually be classified into one of four categories: state-
ments that contain conflicting desires, indecisive statements, actions
that could indicate a desire for counsel, and confusing or unclear refer-
ences to an attorney.2" The courts generally have no problem finding
that statements containing conflicting desires267 and confusing or un-
clear statements referring to an attorney"m are ambiguous requests for
counsel. Courts have more difficulty, however, with indecisive state-
ments2" and actions that may indicate a desire for counsel.27 ° Dif-
ferent courts have reached different conclusions with similar state-
ments. 7' Therefore, if the courts have trouble classifying ambiguous
statements, how can we expect the police to make correct determina-
tions? Under Davis, this concern becomes irrelevant.
On the other hand, when a suspect makes a statement that may or
may not be a request for counsel, the interrogating officer must subjec-
266. See, e.g., infra notes 267-70 and accompanying text.
267. See, e.g., Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 981 (1979). "I would like to have a lawyer, but I'd rather talk to you" shows
both a desire to have an attorney and a desire to continue the questioning. See id. at
516. The court held that this constituted an equivocal request for counsel. See supra
text accompanying note 105.
268. See, e.g., McCree v. Housewright, 689 F.2d 797, 799-800 (8th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1088 (1983) (finding "Well, yes because my brother did say he was
thinking of hiring one himself. I don't know . . . I don't know what it is, really and
truly" was an equivocal response to a question of whether he wanted counsel);
United States v. Grullon, 496 F. Supp. 991, 1000 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (finding that when
suspect refused to sign a Miranda waiver form because "I don't feel up to signing it.
I don't feel up to signing a paper without having a lawyer," was an equivocal request
since it appears he was only requesting an attorney for the signing, not further ques-
tioning). I
269. Compare Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1978) (holding that "maybe I
should have an attorney" is an equivocal request for counsel) with People v. Krueger,
412 N.E.2d 537 (I. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 (1981) (holding that "[mlaybe I
ought to have an attorney" is not an equivocal request for counsel).
270. Compare United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 481
U.S. 1048 (1987) (holding that a suspect's unsuccessful call to his attorney was an
equivocal request for counsel) with Gorel v. United States, 531 F. Supp. 368, 370
(S.D. Tex. 1981) (finding that an attempt by the suspect's wife to contact an attorney
while her husband was being interrogated in their home did not amount to an equiv-
ocal request for counsel).
271. See supra notes 269-70.
tively decide whether this is an ambiguous or unambiguous request.272
If the officer believes a statement is an equivocal request, he can ignore
it and continue the interrogation.273 However, if the trial court finds
the request unequivocal, any statements made after the request are
inadmissible and a guilty defendant may go free.274 Since the officer is
not required to clarify any ambiguities under the Court's approach, even
though he is free to do so, valid confessions may be lost simply be-
cause the officer misinterpreted a suspect's statement. There is also
the danger that an unscrupulous police officer will use a sliding scale to
classify some statements as ambiguous requests so that he can continue
the interrogation, even though in other situations, the officer may treat
the statement as unambiguous. Davis's approach gives police more sub-
jective latitude, which may in turn lead to more unscrupulous police
practices.76
The majority also claims that its approach will not "unduly hamper[]
the gathering of information," which is a primary police function.277
The majority's approach increases the efficiency of the investigative
function because police would no longer be required to stop the inter-
rogation when confronted with an ambiguous request."8 Under the
other two approaches, if a suspect who was just ready to voluntarily
confess makes an ambiguous request, police would have to interrupt
the interrogation.27 This could lead to a possible confession being
lost, even though the suspect did not intend his statement to invoke the
right to counsel.' In these terms, Davis promotes police efficiency,
but what if the suspect did actually desire counsel? Davis may be sacri-
ficing an individual's rights to promote the police function.
272. This differs from the above problem. The above problem involved determining
whether ambiguous statements were requests for counsel, whereas this problem in-
volves determining whether a statement is ambiguous or unambiguous.
273. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
274. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
275. Id. This approach leaves too much discretion to the individual officers. Differ-
ent officers may have different standards as to the standard of clarity required for an
unambiguous request. An officer may make a judgment call and decide an otherwise
unambiguous statement is ambiguous and continue the interrogation. The officer may
not have thought about clarifying the request, which Davis allows but does not re-
quire.
276. If police were required to clarify, they may be more conscious that their clari-
fication questions will be subject to greater review. Generally, anything that is re-
quired is looked at more meticulously, and anything that is optional is not as strictly
reviewed. Therefore, with a clarification approach, officers may think twice about
using "clarifying" questions to intimidate or coerce individuals.
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B. Effect on the Individual
The much greater effect of Davis will be on the rights of the individ-
ual in custody. Pro-Davis commentators might argue that Davis pro-
tects these individuals' rights. Since Davis does not require clarification,
the police will not be tempted to coerce or harass suspects with "clari-
fying" questions to elicit confessions."8 ' The Court's standard would
still allow the suspect to unequivocally assert his right to counsel, but
without the threat of the police using clarifying questions for coercive
purposes."
In reality, Davis will probably not have a measurable effect on this
problem. Even though police are not required to clarify, they are not
prohibited from doing so.2" In fact, many standard police practices
still involve some form of coercive tactics.2" Thus, compared to the
clarification approach, Davis will probably not significantly reduce the
risk of coercive police tactics.
On the other hand, Davis has the potential of substantially hindering
the individual's custodial rights. Davis would mainly affect the rights of
two main groups of individuals: those that do not have the communica-
tion skills to adequately make an unambiguous request for counsel and
those who are so intimidated by the police that they do not or cannot
make an unambiguous request.2" Even the majority, in reaching its
opinion, recognized that these groups might be "disadvantage[d]."2
The irony in this is that these are precisely the groups of individuals
that Miranda intended to protect.287
281. See id.
282. See id. at 2355-56. But see id. at 2362 (Scalia, J., concurring).
283. See id. at 2356.
284. See generally F. INBAU, ET. AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (3d
ed. 1986); C. O'HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION (4th ed. 1978); F.
ROYAL & S. SCHUTr, THE GENTLE ART OF INTERVIEWING AND INTERROGATION (1976); C.
VAN METER, PRINCIPLES OF POLICE INTERROGATION (1973).
285. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356, 2360 n.4 (Scalia, J., concurring); O'BARR, supra
note 218, at 61-76.
286. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2356. "We recognize that requiring a clear assertion of the
right to counsel might disadvantage some suspects who-because of fear, intimida-
tion, lack of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons--will not clearly articulate
their right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer present." Id.
287. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1966). These groups of individu-
als are more likely to incriminate themselves than people who can speak well or are
not intimidated by the police.
In an attempt to convey their desire to have counsel, individuals lack-
ing adequate communication skills may make an equivocal request,
which may be the best that an individual can do. If the police ignore
this request, as allowed by Davis, the suspect may feel that further
requests will likewise be ignored and are useless." As a result, even
though the suspect desired to invoke his right to an attorney, police will
deny him that right simply because he could not articulate his request
with the proper clarity."'9 Consequently, the police violate the
suspect's Miranda right to counsel.
The other group affected by Davis are the individuals who are so
intimidated by the police that it affects their ability to assert an un-
equivocal request for counsel.2" Intimated people are less likely to as-
sert their rights and more likely to speak in vague or ambiguous
terms." If a suspect ambiguously requests the right to counsel and
the police ignore him, the police presence and inaction may intimidate
the individual so much that he will be afraid to try and invoke his right
again."c Since the suspect may think there is no other way to end the
interrogation, he may just confess in order to end his ordeal.' This is
one of the exact situations Miranda sought to protect against: self-in-
crimination. Once again, the government will violate the suspect's
rights.
C. Effect on the Miranda Rights
Beyond the immediate effect of increasing police efficiency at the
expense of denying suspects the protection intended by Miranda, Da-
vis may have some potentially disastrous far-reaching effects. Miranda
has essentially gone unchallenged since the Court enumerated its
Miranda rights in 1966."9 However, by narrowing the scope of protec-
tion accorded by the right to counsel,95 Davis appears to take a siz-
able chunk out of Miranda. The result is that Miranda is not as hal-
288. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2362 (Souter, J., concurring).
289. The clarification approach eliminates this possibility because the officer is re-
quired to determine the suspect's intent. See supra text accompanying note 101. The
per se bar also eliminates this because any ambiguous request requires all questioning
to end. See supra text accompanying note 124.
290. Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2362 (Souter, J., concurring).
291. See O'Barr, supra note 218, at 61-71.
292. See Davis, 114 S. Ct. at 2360-61 n.4 (Scalia, J., concurring).
293. Id.
294. See supra notes 29-80 and accompanying text. Supreme Court cases since
Miranda have generally expanded the scope of protection. Id.
295. By requiring suspects to make unambiguous requests for counsel, the Court
made reinvoking the right more difficult. This goes against the Court's trends through-
out the post-Miranda cases. See supra notes 29-80 and accompanying text.
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lowed as it once seemed to be. Consequently, anti-Miranda factions
may start chipping away at Miranda, believing that it is now vulnerable.
The Davis Court relied on the "need for effective law enforcement"
to support its holding.2" One could construe the Court's decision to
mean that the police function and the investigative process can out-
weigh certain aspects of an individual's rights. Future attacks may focus
on this argument to challenge other areas of the Miranda rights. There-
fore, the possibility exists that Davis may signal an end to the Miranda
rights. In fact, a distinguished criminal law expert has commented that
the Court should abolish Miranda rights and that voluntariness should
determine the admissibility of confessions.297
D. Possible Future Reversal of Davis
Given the great weight of authority advocating the clarifying ap-
proach and the fact that the majority approach only passed by a five to
four vote, the possibility exists that Davis will be overturned in the
future.
1. Advantages of the Clarification Approach
If Davis is overturned, the Court would almost certainly adopt the
current minority approach of requiring officers to clarify ambiguous
requests. The advantages of this approach appear obvious when ana-
lyzed in terms of satisfying the intent of Miranda, promoting the police
function, and protecting the individual's rights.
Miranda stated that a request for an attorney can be invoked "in any
manner." ' The majority's approach does not provide the individual
with the protection contemplated by the "in any manner" language be-
cause numerous groups of individuals would be denied the right to
counsel if unable to unambiguously communicate their desire for coun-
sel.' In barring all interrogations after an ambiguous request, the per
se bar rule would comply with the "in any manner" language. However,
this approach would be contrary to the other intent of Miranda: admit-
296. Davis, 114 S. Ct at 2356.
297. Dix, supra note 260, at 25. Dix contends that "[tihe court should return to
voluntariness as the ultimate question of constitutional admissibility of confessions."
Id.
298. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45.
299. See supra notes 285-93 and accompanying text.
ting "freely and voluntarily" given statements. " A voluntary confes-
sion would be suppressed because a suspect inadvertently makes an
ambiguous request for counsel."'
The clarification approach best satisfies Miranda's intent. Requiring
the police to stop and clarify a suspect's intent, the clarification ap-
proach provides the broad protection consistent with Miranda's "in any
manner" language. 2 This approach also ensures that courts will admit
voluntary statements because police can continue the questioning if
they determine that the suspect desires to continue.'
The majority relies on the "need for effective law enforcement" to
support its position.' However, its approach may actually hinder the
investigative process by eliciting inadmissible statements or opening up
possibilities for police misconduct. 5 Instead of promoting police effi-
ciency, the per se bar rule would deter the investigative process simply
because the police would have to stop the questioning even when a
suspect wants to give a statement.3" Again, the clarification approach,
which provides the police with clear guidelines during interrogations,
best meets the needs of efficient police practice. Whenever confronted
with an ambiguous request, police must stop and clarify, and if the
suspect desires to continue, the police can be sure that their continued
interrogation will not result in inadmissible statements. 7 Therefore,
this approach minimizes the amount of lost and inadmissible confes-
sions and increases investigative efficiency.
The most important factor in adopting a proper standard is the pro-
tection of the individual's rights. The majority's approach clearly pro-
vides the least protection. Even when a suspect desires counsel, the
police may legally deny the right if the suspect does not clearly assert
the request."u Even though the per se bar rule best protects the custo-
dial suspect from self-incrimination, it does so at the cost of denying
300. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478. The Court stated, "[cionfessions remain a proper
element in law enforcement. Any statement given freely and voluntarily without com-
pelling influences is, of course, admissible in evidence .... There is no requirement
that police stop a person who . . . wishes to confess to a crime . . . or [offer] any
other statement he desires to make." Id.
301. See id.
302. See supra text accompanying note 101. If a suspect truly desires an attorney,
the police must respect those wishes since officers are required to stop and deter-
mine the intent. Therefore, the suspect's right to an attorney will be honored even if
ambiguously communicated.
303. See supra text accompanying note 101.
304. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2356 (1994).
305. See supra notes 266-71 and accompanying text.
306. See supra text accompanying note 85.
307. See supra text accompanying note 101.
308. See supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
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the suspect his right to choose." However, under the clarification ap-
proach, all the individual's rights are protected, i.e. the police must end
the interrogation if the police find the suspect wants an attorney and
the suspect is free to continue talking if the police determine that is the
suspect's wishes.3 '
2. Tenuous Holding in Davis
Considering the political make-up of the Court, the Davis decision is
probably not as surprising as it initially seems. The Davis Court is gen-
erally conservative, with Justice Scalia being the most conservative and
Justice Blackmun the most liberal."' The rest of the Court, from con-
servative to liberal, consists of Justice Thomas, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Souter and Stevens."2
Throughout the term that the Court decided Davis, Justices Scalia,
Thomas, O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist usually voted together,
while Justices Ginsburg, Souter, Stevens and Blackmun joined togeth-
er.3  This generally left Justice Kennedy, who usually sides with the
conservatives, to decide the issues."4
When the Court voted along ideological lines in Davis,"' Justice
Kennedy was left to cast the deciding vote. Following his generally
conservative thinking, Justice Kennedy voted with the conservative
group to provide the 5-4 majority.' However, Justice Kennedy has
voted with the liberal group several times."7 The addition of Justice
Breyer, who replaces Justice Blackmun, along with more seniority for
Justices Souter and Ginsburg, could be enough to sway the Court, espe-
cially Justice Kennedy, to reverse Davis. Even though the liberal group
loses their most liberal member, the generally centrist Justice Breyer
could bring more agreement to the Court because he is known for
309. The rule prohibits a suspect from making further statements even if he wished
to continue. See supra text accompanying note 85.
310. See supra text accompanying note 101.
311. See Joan Biskupic, Justices Follow a Mostly Conservative Course: Kennedy
Assuming Pivotal Role on a Supreme Court That Continues to Redefine Itsef, WASH.
PosT, July 4, 1994, at A12.
312. Id.
313. Id. at Al, A12.
314. Id. at A12.
315. See supra notes 153, 203.
316. See supra note 153.
317. See Biskupic, supra note 311, at A12.
bringing together people at the extremes."' Additionally, since Justice
Breyer's opinions emphasize balancing tests rather than ideology,31 he
may be able to convince the pivotal Justice Kennedy or the other more
conservative Justices that the clarification approach best balances the
interests of the police and the custodial suspect.
Notwithstanding the advantages of the clarification approach, the
Court suggested in its own opinion that Davis may be tenuous.2 The
Court praised the clarification approach as "good police practice," but
fails to adopt it without stating a reason.32' Therefore, due to the
majority's apparent favorable recognition of the clarification approach
and Justice Breyer's ability to unite ideological factions, the Court may
and should overturn Davis.
E. Effect on Current Law
Since a Supreme Court ruling is the law of the land for federal law,
the federal courts have no choice but to adopt the Davis approach.2 2
Supreme Court rulings, however, do not necessarily bind state courts,
even though the states usually follow the Court. State constitutions
allow the individual states to provide their citizens with greater protec-
tion than provided for by the United States Constitution." Even
though Davis is only several months old, two states have already reject-
ed its holding.324 The two state opinions evidence disfavor with Davis
by giving criminal suspects greater protection.
In State v. Hoey,25 police arrested and advised Hoey of his Miranda
rights.32 After a detective asked Hoey whether he thought he would
need an attorney, Hoey replied, "I don't have the money to buy one."327
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Davis v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2356 (1994). Referring to the clarifica-
tion approach, the majority stated that "it will often be good police practice for the
interviewing officers to clarify whether or not he actually wants an attorney." Id. The
Court does not say, however, why it does not adopt this approach, but simply that it
"decline[s] to adopt [the] rule." Id.
321. Id. The Court recognized that the clarification rule would "minimize the chance
of a confession being suppressed due to subsequent judicial second-guessing as to the
meaning of the suspect's statement regarding counsel." Id.
322. See supra note 261.
323. See, e.g., infra note 331.
324. See State v. Hoey, 881 P.2d 504 (Haw. 1994) (rejecting Davis after only three
months); State v. Farley, 452 S.E.2d 50, 59 (W. Va. 1994) (rejecting Davis after five
months).
325. Hoey, 881 P.2d 504 (Haw. 1994).
326. Id. at 508-09.
327. Id. at 509. The response was ambiguous because Hoey apparently did not
know he could have a lawyer appointed at no charge, and because if Hoey knew
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Instead of attempting to clarify the response, the detective continued
the interrogation and subsequently obtained a confession.328 Based on
the confession, the trial court convicted Hoey.' The Hawai'i Supreme
Court vacated and remanded, holding that because Hoey ambiguously
responded and the detective did not clarify, the subsequent confession
was inadmissible.' The court rejected the Davis standard and adopt-
ed the minority approach mainly because the court chose to provide its
citizens with "broader protection" than Davis allowed." The court
"adopt[s] the reasoning of Justice Souter" as the rationale behind its
holding. 2
Similarly, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in State v.
Farley' expressly rejected Davis and adopted the clarification ap-
proach.' Like Hoey, the court in Farley relied on the need to protect
the suspect's rights by "level[ing] the playing field ... for the criminal
defendant faced with custodial interrogation."' The custodial suspect
needs protection because of the "coercive atmosphere" of an interroga-
tion.' The court also "note[d] with interest" that Hawaii rejected Da-
vis after only three months. 7 If more states follow the lead of Hawaii
and West Virginia in rejecting Davis, the effect could snowball into
most states rejecting Davis and following their originally adopted clari-
fication approach. Therefore, Hawaii and West Virginia may be a pre-
cursor to the eventual reversal of Davis.
this, the response did not indicate if he would have wanted the free lawyer.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 515.
330. Id. at 524.
331. Id. at 523. The court notes that they are "free to give broader protection under
the Hawai'i Constitution than that given by the federal constitution." Id. In refusing to
adopt Davis, "we choose to afford our citizens broader protection under . . . the
Hawai'i Constitution than that recognized by the Davis majority ...by aligning our-
selves with the jurisdictions" following the clarification approach. Id.
332. Id.; see supra notes 204-57 and accompanying text for Justice Souter's reason-
rng.
333. 452 S.E.2d 50 (W. Va. 1994).
334. Id. at 59 n.12.
335. Id. The court asserted that the "primary purpose of our interrogation rules is
to level the playing field, to some extent, for the criminal defendant faced with cus-
todial interrogation." Id. (emphasis added).
336. Id. This coercive atmosphere includes "police pressure, secrecy, and the lack
of sophistication of many criminal defendants." Id.
337. Id.
VI. CONCLUSION
Ever since Miranda v. Arizona set forth the right to counsel in 1966,
the Court had not defined the requisite level of clarity required to in-
voke the right to counsel. The lower courts have all adopted one of
three approaches: the clarification approach, the per se bar, and one
allowing police to ignore ambiguous requests,' with a clear majority
adopting the clarification approach.' Therefore, when the Court fi-
nally addressed the issue in Davis v. United States, most judicial ob-
servers thought the Court would formally adopt the majority
clarification approach." When the Court chose the approach allowing
police to ignore an ambiguous request for counsel and continue their
interrogation, the result was clearly unexpected.
In attempting to address the "need for effective law enforcement," the
Court may have initiated the unraveling of the Miranda rights. By
seemingly focusing on the "need for effective law enforcement" rather
than on the need to protect the intended rights accorded in Miranda,
the Court may have opened up the door for future attacks on the
Miranda rights by providing a basis for such an attack. The clarifica-
tion approach, which most expected the Court to adopt, best balances
the intent of Miranda and the need to promote the police function.
Requiring police to stop the interrogation and clarify a suspect's ambig-
uous request protects the individual's rights as well as prevents possible
acquittals due to lost confessions.
Although the Court did not adopt this approach, the possibility exists
for a future reversal of Davis. Since the Davis Court failed to adopt the
clarification approach by one vote, and because the Court's make-up is
changing, a future Court may reverse Davis and adopt the clarification
approach. Davis is already showing signs of weakness, as Hawaii has
expressly rejected the holding after only three months, followed by
West Virginia two months later. 4' However, if Davis survives,
Miranda rights may begin to weaken or eventually even become non-
existent. Therefore, the much anticipated and surprising decision in
Davis may signal the end of the Miranda rights if it remains good law.
TOM CHEN
338. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 101-22 and accompanying text.
340. See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 324-37 and accompanying text
